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“To Serve Revenge for the Dead”:
Chinese Communist Responses to
Japanese War Crimes in the PRC
Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949–1956
Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash
ABSTRACT Using newly available documents from the PRC Foreign
Ministry Archive, this article traces the evolving legacies of the War of
Resistance in the first seven years of the People’s Republic. Analysis is
offered of PRC campaigns against Japanese bacteriological war crimes, cri-
ticisms of American dealings with Japanese war criminals, and the 1956 trial
of Japanese at Shenyang. Throughout, behind-the-scenes tensions with the
Soviet Union and internal bureaucratic struggles over the Japanese legacy
regarding these matters are revealed. The article thereby aims to shed light
on how the War of Resistance affected post-war China’s foreign relations,
demonstrating how the young Republic advantageously used wartime
legacies as diplomatic tools in relations with the superpowers and within
the orchestrated clangour of domestic propaganda campaigns.
On 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s unconditional surren-
der to the Allied forces, effectively ending decades of Japanese hostilities with
China and opening the door to a revived Chinese civil war. Although the
Kantō Army cannons had been silenced, the physical and emotional legacies
of Japan’s invasion and occupation could not be so easily erased from China’s
national memory.1 With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
the civil war and subsequent consolidation of communist power in the early
1950s, leaders and ideologues in Beijing frequently returned to the legacies of
Japanese imperialism as one of a variety of means used to foment mass support
for the new regime.2 After the Sino-Japanese rapprochement of the 1970s, the
1 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); for general monographs on the political situation in
China during and after the “Manchurian Incident,” see Sun Youli, China and the Origins of the
Pacific War, 1931–1941 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993); Parks Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese
Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
2 Julia Strauss, “Paternalist terror: the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries and regime consolida-
tion in the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1953,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 44,
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CCP temporarily submerged its reliance on these anti-Japanese themes, but they
erupted again, with renewed vigour, in the 1990s. The recent emergence of stri-
dent Chinese rhetoric about Japan – bridging the gap between Party and people
and the Party’s conscious re-crafting of historical narratives to emphasize Chinese
victimization – has given scholars concerned with the uses and abuses of
anti-Japanese nationalism much food for thought.3 However, in assessing the
deep structure of these nationalistic assaults on Japan’s wartime past, scholars
hardly ever turn to the 1950s, and sustained analyses of the growth and evolution
of anti-Japanese nationalism in the decade are rare.4
In recent years, the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive has begun the painfully
slow process of declassifying and releasing documents for public use, including
significant numbers relating to Japan. From the CCP perspective, these docu-
ments are intended to reveal the Party’s close attention to, and disposal of,
Japanese war crimes. And indeed, they illustrate multiple ways in which the
legacy of Japanese war crimes animated (and were often manipulated by)
the Chinese government in the early 1950s. Reading beyond current CCP inten-
tions for these documents reveals contradictions and a more nuanced approach
by the CCP in the 1950s in which deep anger at Japan is displaced by a much
more pragmatic and even amnesiac outlook. While it is unfortunate that records
after 1960 have not yet been released, sufficient archival material exists for a reas-
sessment of the CCP’s interpretation of the Japanese wartime legacy in China.
Reassessing the changing Chinese images of Japan in the 1950s is rendered par-
ticularly significant by the drastic fluctuations of China’s Japan policy in that
decade. The beginning of the 1950s witnessed a grisly emphasis on Japanese war-
time atrocities, but by 1956 this had given way to a sentiment bordering on for-
giveness as China sought rapprochement. Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic drive failed,
rolled back by the rise of rightist Kishi Nobusuke in Japan and the radicalism
of the Great Leap Forward, but the disintegration of hopes for friendly relations
footnote continued
No. 1 (2002), pp. 80–103, and “Morality, coercion, and state building by campaign in the early PRC:
regime consolidation and after, 1949–1956,” The China Quarterly, No. 188 (2006), pp. 891–912. Links
between post-war anti-Japanese sentiment and mass propaganda campaigns are analysed superficially in
Adam Cathcart, “Chinese nationalism in the shadow of Japan, 1945–1950,” PhD dissertation, Ohio
University, 2005. For innovative but often general discussion of Sino-Japanese relations during the
US occupation of Japan, see Okamoto Koichi, “Imaginary settings: Sino-Japanese-United States
relations during the occupation years,” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2000.
3 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004); Joshua Fogel, “Introduction: the Nanjing Massacre in history,” in Joshua
Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000); Parks Coble, “China’s ‘new-remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance,”
The China Quarterly, No. 190 (2007), pp. 394–410.
4 Two recent monographs analyse the evolution of war memory in the 1950s, but the primary focus in
these works is on Japan rather than China, and the source base is largely Japanese. Takashi
Yoshida, The Making of the Rape of Nanking: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social
Politics in Japan, 1945–2005 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).
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between the estranged neighbours did not diminish the potency of the Japan issue
for Chinese leaders. Thus, the decade of the 1950s reveals the full spectrum of
CCP tactics towards Japan and, historically, the first CCP attempts to deal
with the Japanese legacy as the party in power. Legacies of Japan’s invasion
remained pervasive in official Chinese narratives, as the CCP skilfully modified
its interpretations of the past to serve both domestic and foreign agendas of
the young People’s Republic.
In understanding the Cold War interpretation of Japanese wartime atrocities in
China, it is instructive to turn to work recently produced by scholars of post-war
Europe. In examining the legacies of German war crimes in divided Europe, his-
torian Norman Goda explains how Nazi crimes became entwined with the inter-
national and domestic politics of the Cold War. In his recent examination of
German war criminals in Spandau Prison, Goda verifies that perpetrators of atro-
cities in the Second World War became pawns in the Cold War, veritable
“political prisoners.”He bluntly and accurately states that “war criminals became
factors in international relations.”5 Could the same be said for Japanese war
criminals in Asia? The history of the PRC from 1949 to 1956, as shown by the
documents about that period held by the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive,
suggests that war crimes and trials of war criminals played at least as much of
a political role in post-war Asia as in Europe.6
In the chaos immediately following the Second World War, the links
between past Japanese war crimes and Cold War policy on mainland China
are slightly more convoluted than their European counterparts. As the Chinese
Communist Party expanded its territorial hold, establishing a government and
consolidating power remained the primary objective. Mass movements were
highly significant instruments in pushing forward the CCP domestic agenda in
this period.7 Foreign Ministry documents lend weight to the assertion that
mass movements were indeed used to promote regime consolidation, but also
re-emphasize the link between domestic consolidation or security and a “correct”
foreign policy.8 By early 1950, the CCP seized hold of specific legacies of
Japanese war crimes, especially bacteriological weapons atrocities, to infuse
mass propaganda with anti-Japanese nationalism. For contemporary researchers,
the individual testimonials present in the Foreign Ministry Archive offer impor-
tant insights into how people remembered the Japanese occupation and provide
5 Norman J.W. Goda, Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), p. 10. See also Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the
Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
6 Kodama Yoshio, Sugamo Diary (trans. Taro Fukuda) (Japan: Radiopress, 1960), pp. 4, 264–68; Utsumi
Aiko, Sugamo Prison: The Peace Movement of the War Criminals (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan,
2004).
7 Specifically, Strauss addresses the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries as one factor in CCP
consolidation of power in China; see Strauss, “Paternalist terror” and “Morality, coercion, and state
building.”
8 Chen Jian’s work has repeatedly demonstrated the links between domestic and foreign policy in the
PRC; see Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2001).
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some understanding of the degree to which the atrocities committed by Japanese
armed forces could be used by the CCP to educate and mobilize the public.
The abundance of testimonials and personal exposés of Japanese BW atrocities
in the ForeignMinistry Archive should prompt a note of caution, as these released
documents represent only official memory and were probably released to further
the contemporary narrative of Japanese atrocities in China. Party motives aside,
however, to scholars of the consolidation period or anti-Japanese sentiment,
these testimonials reveal striking contradictions between Party and popular
remembrance of Japan’s atrocities. While the Party moved quickly to make
connections between Japan and the United States, the Chinese people appeared
less willing to link the US with specific atrocities committed during the War
of Resistance.
The Foreign Ministry Archive materials also reveal the depth and persistence
of interdepartmental co-operation and competition in dealing with legacies of the
War of Resistance. Because of interest regarding Japan among the constituent
parts of the new PRC government, issues normally placed strictly in the sphere
of foreign relations ballooned into much more massive operations. Analysing
and publicizing the legacy of Japanese war crimes became a task that engaged
the participation of virtually every ministry in the government. Our analysis
reveals three primary areas in which the War of Resistance remained most res-
onant within the PRC bureaucracy: in the handling of Japanese bacteriological
war crimes evidence; in Sino-Soviet discussions on war criminals and joint con-
demnations of American occupation policy towards war criminals in Japan;
and in preparation for the 1956 trials of Japanese prisoners at Shenyang 沈阳.9
The Legacy of Japanese Bacteriological War Crimes
The lingering passions of Chinese resentment of Japan’s wartime bacteriological
weapons (xijunzhanqi 细菌战器, BW) programmes, partially as a result of their
breadth, provided the young Chinese government with one of the most potent
publicity weapons for both its domestic and international agendas.10 In the pol-
itically charged atmosphere of the Cold War, the CCP was well aware that the
failure of the Allied Powers to indict those responsible for atrocities committed
in the name of BW research (such as Ishii Shiro) placed the United States at
odds with public opinion in China. And, when politically convenient, the
9 Important scholarship exists on the early development of China’s Foreign Ministry. For interesting
commentary on the role of ideology and Mao Zedong Thought in early diplomatic efforts, see
Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 5–37; for dis-
cussion specifically on relations and negotiations with Japan, see Kurt Werner Radtke, China’s
Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The role of Liao Chengzhi (New York: Manchester University Press,
1990).
10 For foundational scholarship on Japan’s Second World War era BW programme which rarely delves
into the legacies of these programmes in China, see David Williams and Peter Wallace, Unit 731:
The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989); and Sheldon Harris,
Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945 (New York: Routledge, 2002).
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memory of Japan’s BW programme and reminders of its links to the United
States would solidify the notion of America as the new enemy.11
It was not the CCP, however, who first used BW rhetoric to serve Cold War
objectives. On 24 December 1949 the Soviet Union commenced the trial of 12
Japanese soldiers, including former members of Japanese BW units, before a
military court in the Russian far eastern city of Khabarovsk.12 After the Soviet
announcement of these trials Beijing’s initial response was rushed, consisting of
little more than praise for the Soviet initiative.13 The trials represented a fairly
blatant Soviet attempt to harness resentment of Japan to strengthen popular
Chinese support for the impending Sino-Soviet Treaty, even though they revealed
a lack of co-ordination between Mao Zedong and his new Soviet allies.
Considering the fact that the CCP had just declared a government in Beijing in
October of the same year, it is somewhat surprising that, after an initially
hasty response, the Chinese government was able to mobilize so rapidly. In
fact, after a short time, the CCP began to take full advantage of the Soviet-led
propaganda offensive against Japanese and American war crimes as justification
for a stronger Sino-Soviet friendship.14
In the weeks and months following the Khabarovsk trials, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry, Health Ministry, People’s Liberation Army, Personnel Departments
and Xinhua co-operated in the stimulation of widespread anti-BW education
and propaganda campaigns stemming from the Khabarovsk allegations. These
campaigns, among the first country-wide mass movements of the new People’s
Republic, represent important examples of continued anti-Japanese sentiment
in China, reveal the agency of the Soviet Union in promoting the
anti-Japanese legacy in China, and indicate the CCP’s methodology for
co-ordinating a nationwide propaganda campaign. Furthermore, the need to
publicize the Khabarovsk trials within the confines of an emerging official narra-
tive facilitated the consolidation of departmental and central power. It encour-
aged rapid development of the PRC’s mass education infrastructure in its
11 The 1952 anti-BW movements are a perfect example of this linkage, in that the CCP succeeded in link-
ing Japan’s BW experiments with allegations of US employment of their results to launch BW attacks
on North Korea and Manchuria. Surprisingly, although the 1952 allegations have received much atten-
tion, only Milton Leitenberg has explicitly linked them to Japanese atrocities. See Milton Leitenberg,
“New Russian evidence on the Korean War biological warfare allegations: background and analysis,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 11 (1998), pp. 185–99; see also Patricia Nash,
“Plague and propaganda: the significance of biological weapons allegations in the Korean War,”
Wittenberg University East Asian Studies Journal, Vol. 33 (2008), pp. 93–114.
12 For official information and transcripts from the trials see Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen
of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).
13 “Sulian Yuandong binghai junqu junshi fating,” Renmin ribao, 29 December 1950, p. 4.
14 For further investigation on the legacy of Japan’s BW programme within the matrix of Chinese nation-
alism and Sino-Soviet relations, see Adam Cathcart, “‘Against invisible enemies’: Japanese biological
weapons and China’s Cold War, 1949–1950,” Chinese Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009),
pp. 60–89. See also Jing-Bao Nie, “The West’s dismissal of the Khabarovsk trial as ‘communist pro-
paganda’: ideology, evidence and international bioethics,” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, Vol. 1, No. 1
(2004), pp. 32–42.
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formative years through increased intradepartmental co-operation, most
obviously between the Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry and Xinhua.
These departments all participated in the dissemination of civilian testimony,
but the results were unpredictable as the testimonies did not always contribute
to the current Party line. It is clear, however, that resentment towards, and some-
time vivid personal memories of, Japan’s wartime BW experiments among
Chinese citizens showed no signs of fading. Chinese living in some north-eastern
areas remained perched above the poisonous remnants of the programme.
In 1950, local health departments in Harbin were pushing the central government
to conduct more investigations into the Japanese BW experiments, revealing
entrenched anti-Japanese resentment in affected areas.15 Scientific investigations
were augmented by interviews, and it seems that no amount of scientific or phys-
ical evidence could parallel the sometimes emotion-laden personal testimonies
and recollections of the BW programme. Page after page of signatures, thumb
prints and scrawled narratives indicate the depth of mass support for investi-
gations and cataloguing of Japanese war crimes.
With knowledge and resentment of Japan’s BW programme already abundant
among Chinese civilians, one might assume it would be easy to utilize this
anti-Japanese nationalism for propaganda purposes. However, civilian testimo-
nials illustrate the degree to which public opinion was actually incongruent
with current Party goals. In particular, although CCP propaganda emphasized
American complicity with Japan’s crimes, citizen testimony rarely included any
mention of the United States before 1952.16 Before resentment of Japan’s atroci-
ties in China could be harnessed to increase support for the Foreign Ministry’s
diplomatic agenda, it was necessary for the government to remould the resent-
ment to a certain extent.17
15 Asian Division of Waijiaobu to Harbin Weishengbu, Foreign Ministry Archives, File 105-00076-02,
pp. 84–85. See also “Rijun zhanqu Qingsheng shengwu diaochasuo jiqi chetui qingxing jian wen”
(“Institute of Biological Investigation in Japanese-occupied Jinsheng, as well as news regarding the situ-
ation after their withdrawal”), 1 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document
105-00092-07; “Guanyu Anda jujiayao xijun gongchang jishi” (“Record of Anda [city] Jujiayao [district]
biological weapons factory”), 19 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document
105-00092-03. Similar investigations were conducted around the same time in Heilongjiang province,
in areas affected by Unit 731 near Pingfan; see “Guanyu Pingfan xijun gongchang jishi” (“Record
regarding Pingfang’s biological weapons factory”), 19 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives, Document 105-00092-02; “Heilongjiang renmin kongsu Riben xijun zhanfan jianzheng
shu” (“Heilongjiang people accuse Japanese of biological war crimes: record of eyewitness testimony”),
20 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00092-05, p. 1.
16 The 1952 anti-BW propaganda campaign was targeted at the United States, but many of the themes of
the 1950 campaign were resurrected. The testimony of civilians is recorded in Report of the International
Scientific Commission for the Investigation Concerning the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea
and China (Peking, 1952). For analysis of the purpose and results of the 1952 anti-BW rhetoric, see Ruth
Rogaski, “Nature, annihilation, and modernity: China’s Korean War germ-warfare experience reconsid-
ered,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), pp. 381–415; Patricia Nash, “Plague and
propaganda: the significance of Korean War bacteriological weapons allegations,” Wittenberg East
Asian Studies Journal (Spring 2008), pp. 93–114.
17 Ibid.; “Heilongjiang people accuse Japanese of biological war crimes: record of eyewitness testimony”;
“Chen Wanli deng ren de baogao ji dui Riji zai quanHua zhi wupin jianyan jieguo de shuoming”
(“Chen Wanli and other people’s reports on proof of inspection results about Japanese aeroplanes
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The urge to yoke anti-Japanese nationalism with the more recent upswing in
anti-American propaganda found its outlet in exhibits and meetings to educate
the people on Japan’s BW programme. These exhibits are of interest because
they not only illustrate one of the methods used by the CCP to harness existing
anti-Japanese nationalism for specific purposes, but also reveal a surprising
degree of Party co-ordination and interdepartmental co-operation on both the
national and local levels.18 One such exhibition began a mere three months
after the conclusion of the Khabarovsk trials and exemplifies both the edu-
cational and bureaucratic usage of Japanese BW information.19
The National Sanitation Exhibition, by virtue of its name, would appear to
suggest that Health Ministry officials were responsible for its organization and
execution. While the Health Ministry was indeed deeply involved, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry was arguably more invested in its successful execution.
Co-operation between the Health Ministry and the Foreign Ministry is not
only confirmed by the bulging file of interdepartmental correspondence, but
was explicitly urged by Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu 章汉夫. Zhang led
the Foreign Ministry’s active response to the BW issue, stating that the investi-
gation into “offences of the Japanese bacteriological war criminals in China
are not a matter for only one office, but rather are a matter for the entire govern-
ment.” Zhang went on to tell the assembled representatives that Japanese BW
crimes were not something the government could deal with “in just a couple of
weeks,” and were “not just a domestic matter, but an international propaganda
matter.”20
The multi-faceted nature of Japanese BW offences created a unique atmos-
phere in which departments were able to collaborate on the same issue with vastly
different stated aims. The Health Ministry promoted public awareness of the
effects of Japanese BW testing with emphasis on the north-east; the Foreign
Ministry elaborated on the wider and international public consequences of
Japan’s BW programme. In statements concerning the National Sanitation
Exhibition, Zhang Hanfu skilfully wove the “present” use of knowledge of
Japanese BW crimes (information collected, organized and disseminated by the
footnote continued
casting things all over China”), 30 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document
105-00092-12.
18 “Tiantan fangbingchu gongren zuotan Rijun zhanjushi de qingshili jilu” (“Record of Temple of Heaven
Disease Prevention Office convening a discussion of workers about the situation during the period
of Japanese military occupation,”) 7 March 1950, PRC Foreign Ministry Archive Document
105-00092-06, pp. 1–9.
19 For discussion of hygiene exhibitions in Beijing’s Zhongshan Park in July 1949, and the interaction
between public health discourse and anti-biological weapons publicity, see Sneh Rajbhandari,
“‘Walking on two legs’: the expansion of health services in China, 1949–1956,” presented at Midwest
Conference on Asian Affairs, St Olaf College, Minnesota, 11 October 2008. See also Rogaski,
“Nature, annihilation, and modernity.”
20 “Guanyu souji Riben xijun zhanfan zuixing de cailiao” (“Materials regarding Japanese biological war
crimes guilty activities”), 1950, PRC Foreign Ministry Archive Document 105-00076-02, p. 36.
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Health Ministry) into the responsibilities of the Foreign Ministry in 1950, its job
being to use the knowledge to “expose, and strike at American imperialism’s plot
to revive Japan.”21 In this manner, Second World War atrocities both fuelled
Cold War imperatives and alliances and facilitated further interdepartmental
co-operation.
The spring 1950 Health Ministry exhibition on Japanese BW was subjected to
analysis from various departments not directly involved with the organization of
the exhibit, demonstrating increasing interest in anti-Japanese feeling within all
branches of central and local government. The reports were then forwarded to
the main actors, including the Foreign and Health Ministries, thus contributing
to the construction of a cohesive propaganda campaign by the Foreign Ministry.
A particularly effective example of the dual-edged nature of these external assess-
ments is one authored by the Personnel Department (renshichu 人事处) on 5
March 1950. Along with criticism of the exhibit’s “explanations of the spread
and harm of the plague and infectivity of the various bacteria from the bacteria
bombs,” and calling for a greater emphasis on public health, the report offered a
suggestion for effectively emphasizing the anti-Japanese aspect of the exhibit:
Chinese people experienced Japanese bacteria war criminals’ slaughter in person, and after the
exhibition, we [therefore] had greater hatred towards war criminals … We wish to print
the [exhibit] materials and make them brochures as the evidence of Japanese criminals’ bloody
debt … We suggest expanding exhibitions in a manner that is bound to propagandize and
instruct the public.22
In its assessment, the Personnel Department makes the self-evident observation
that is frequently overlooked in scholarly treatments of the early People’s
Republic: the CCP was well aware that Chinese memory of suffering at the
hands of Japanese could be a potent means of mass mobilization.23 The varying
degrees of emphasis and participation in these campaigns by local governments,
as in examinations of the War of Resistance itself, suggest that responses to
Japanese war crimes were not entirely uniform.
Investigations into Japan’s BW programme did not rely on civilian testimony
alone, nor were they confined to the north-east. One group of accusations by the
Hebei Military District Health Ministry (Hebei zhejunqu weishengbu河北者军区
卫生部) was redolent with outrage at Japan. After discussing the difficulties
experienced in the resistance war, redeeming these by saying they were “weath-
ered together among the Hebei soldiers and people ( junmin军民),” the compilers
noted that they wished for their research “to serve [as] revenge for the dead
(women yao wei si zhe baochou 我们要为死者报仇)” and “stimulate a rich strain
of thought” among the people about Japan’s BW crimes.24
21 Ibid. p. 36.
22 Ibid. p. 51.
23 For further details on the foundations of co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Xinhua in 1950, see ibid. pp. 2–8.
24 “Youguan xizhun zhanfan ziliao” (“Materials concerning biological war crimes”), 23 February 1950,
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00092-08.
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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was an important agent of memory, and
a sizeable number of PLA investigations were distributed throughout the govern-
ment, informing various agencies about the type of past massacres which the
army hoped in the future to prevent. In early 1950 Shi Muqiao 石木乔 of the
205th Health Brigade of the PLA submitted one such report to his unit and
subsequently to the Foreign Ministry, unsubtly entitled “Record of Japanese
Devils Massacring Central Hebei People by Firing Poison Gas Shells.”25 Hebei
military officers wrote reports on Japanese BW with gusto, summoning up
past indignities to spur the army on to greater acts of patriotic self-defence.
While the PLA was active in investigating Japanese crimes in the early 1950s,
few agencies matched the vigour and scope of the nation’s various provincial
health ministries. Health Ministry officials in Zhejiang were intensely investi-
gating BW in 1950, led by the respected and active Chen Wanli 陈万里. Chen
had been in the Health Ministry during the Kuomintang administration, but
his participation in building a bulwark against BW was welcomed in the early
years of the PRC. For example, Li Dequan 李德全, the omnipresent head of the
Health Ministry, showed her trust in Chen’s work by inviting him to several key
meetings on Japanese BW crimes held in Beijing in early February 1950. In one
of Chen’s reports of Japanese dispersion of BW-infected items from aeroplanes
in 1940, he gives the years in the “Minguo” style, but it takes no edge off his accu-
sations, which extended into analysis of why the Japanese wanted to conquer China
in the first place.26 Chen’s thorough analysis of the Chengde Incident and recurrent
plague outbreaks thereafter represents a cornerstone of CCP anti-Japanese BW
documentation.27 In their investigations of plague in Zhejiang, Chinese authors con-
cluded reports with flourishes demanding revenge, and, notably excoriating the
Kuomintang for its failure to halt the massacres.28 By reporting Japanese crimes
to the new PRC government, former Nationalist sympathizers suggested that the
war crimes could, at their most basic level, act as a point of convergence in a
still fractured society recovering from massive upheaval.29
25 “Rimo shifang jundu cansha Jizhong renmin de julu” (“Record of Japanese devils massacring
mid-Hebei people by firing poison gas shells”), 9 February 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives, Document 105-00092-09.
26 “Chen Wanli and other people’s reports on proof of inspection results about Japanese aeroplanes
casting things over China.”
27 “Guanyu Chengde shuyi diaocha baogaoshu” (“Collection of reports concerning investigation of plague
in Changde”), 30 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00092-17; for
a Western examination of the Changde incident, see Williams and Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese
Army’s Secret of Secrets, pp. 95–101.
28 “Guanyu Riji zai Jinhua sanbo shuyi ganjun de buchong yijian” (“Opinions regarding Japanese aero-
planes spreading and sowing plague spores in Jinhua that are returning”), 30 March 1952, PRCMinistry
of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00092-13, p. 2.
29 On similar themes of the incorporation of former Nationalist officials into the judiciary of the early
PRC, see Qiang Fang, “A mixed picture: complaint systems in Late Republican China,” unpublished
manuscript. How former collaborators with Japan were incorporated into the anti-Japanese rhetoric
and campaigns of the early PRC is an even more vexing question about which virtually nothing has
been written. Some examples of the CCP using anti-rightist campaigns to revive accusations of wartime
pro-Japanese collaboration, however, can be found in local north-eastern newspapers in 1951, particu-
larly July–August 1951 issues of Dongbei chaoxian renmin ribao (Yanji).
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Perhaps such continuities imply not some inherently retrospective tendency
among Chinese, but that, by the very act of establishing a state, the central govern-
ment of the PRC had inherited the grievances against Japan dating back to the
1930s. The CCP therefore collected testimonies from an array of geographical
and temporal periods, with apparently little regard for the political views of the tes-
tifiers. However, testimonies brought to the CCP may also have been regarded by
some as a means of cementing loyalties to the regime while emphasizing common
anti-Japanese grounds. For instance, the Foreign Ministry received the text of a
long speech given by Wan Zuyuan, a witness of Japanese atrocities in the south
in 1938, who was not a member of the CCP at the time but working for the Red
Cross.30 Another testimony was written by a student who had been enrolled in a
puppet university in 1940–41, a background which many Party members might
have regarded as suspect.31 However, neither testifier’s questionable background
tainted the ardency of their accusations of Japanese BW crimes in China.
In the months prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the legacy of Japanese
bacteriological war crimes caused the PRC’s departmental boundaries to deploy
in an interlocking and expanding propaganda front. The scope of activities that
fell under “bacteriological weapons defence” was broadening, in part because it
necessarily had to adapt to and mirror the widespread nature of the actual crimes.
The type of education exemplified in the National Sanitation Exhibition assumed
prime importance as the Party implored citizens to understand and remember the
Japanese war crimes. Propaganda and education campaigns then instigated ques-
tioning into American treatment of Japanese BW criminals to intensify antagon-
ism towards the United States. The Personnel Department, in an assessment of
the exhibition, wanted to know how many Japanese BW criminals “were set
free by American imperialism,” among other questions that were designed to
drive home resentment over the American–Japanese immunity deals.32
In a fascinating example of the continuity from Nationalist to communist con-
trol, Judge Mei Ruao梅汝澳 penned his own opinion on the National Sanitation
Exhibition. During the Tokyo trials, Mei had represented the Nationalist govern-
ment and was a well-known authority on Japanese war crimes and international
law. Despite the assertive and accusatory tone of the Personnel Department
memo, Mei Ruao’s opinion, observed in a letter to the Health Ministry, differed.
He wrote:
I received an urgent order to attend the National Sanitation Exhibition and check the materials
of the bacteriological war criminals. I therefore went to the Cultural Palace [Wenhuagong] and
30 “Guanyu chengban Riben xijun zhanfan zuotan jiyao” (“Record of conversations regarding punishment
of Japanese biological war criminals”), 30 March 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives,
Document 105-00092-15, pp. 1–2.
31 Ibid. p. 3.
32 “Wobu canguan ‘Riben xizhun zhanfan e'xing zhengju zhanlanhui’ de jidian yijian” (“A few views of
our [personnel] department regarding the ‘Japanese BW war crimes evidence exhibition’”), 5 March
1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00076-02, p. 51.
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Tian’anmen, and talked to the director, checking up on these items and materials. They were
not great in quantity, but the design of exhibition was rather good. All the sources originated
from areas within the country (most of them were from areas round Haerbin). They were
detailed and reliable (there wasn’t anything exaggerated or fake). And the exhibit should not
force involvement in international diplomacy, as there were not any possibilities to bring inter-
national entanglement.33
Mei’s background in international law lent particular weight to his views. Having
Mei as an advocate emphasized the legitimacy of the materials in the exhibition.
In the 1950s, Mei would occasionally appear in the press to reaffirm the CCP’s
position on Japanese war crimes.34
Japanese war crimes indeed served CCP purposes in domestic mobilization,
but their utility was not restricted to the domestic arena. While Mei asserts the
neutrality of the National Sanitation Exhibition, the legacy of Japanese war
crimes was not ignored in the formation of China’s foreign policy and was, in
fact, a very volatile topic.
Japanese War Crimes and Foreign Policy Objectives
It was precisely on the diplomatic front where the legacy of Japanese war crimes
was particularly useful in forging alliances, identifying common enemies and
covering up disagreements. In the early Cold War, the obvious target of this
propaganda was the United States. Meetings between representatives of the
Soviet Union and the PRC illustrate the potency of Japan’s legacy as fuel for
anti-American propaganda. But specific questions and complaints within the
Sino-Soviet discussions and debate concerning Japanese war criminals serve as
an early indicator of increasing tension between the Soviet Union and PRC.
The apparently close relationship between the United States and Japan, and
easily constructed parallels between the American presence in East Asia
and that of Imperial Japan, presented the CCP with a sitting target for propa-
ganda campaigns, especially campaigns whose roots lay in the Japanese invasion
and occupation of China. In November 1950, as China’s focus was shifting to
threats posed by the United States in East Asia, General Douglas MacArthur
issued his Order No. 5, releasing many Japanese war criminals well before
their time had been served. Among those released was the wartime Japanese
ambassador to China and former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru.35 The
PRC was well aware of MacArthur’s order, and a number of memos concerning
the releases were filtered through the Foreign Ministry. In spite of his punishing
schedule and unrelenting stream of Korean War crises emerging daily, the issue
33 “Materials regarding Japanese biological war crimes guilty activities,” p. 52.
34 “Tan Riben zhanzheng fanzui fenzi de chuli wenti: Guoji faxuejia Mei Ru’ao,” Liaodong ribao, 24 June
1956, p. 4.
35 Shigemitsu, after his release in 1950, re-entered the Japanese political arena associating himself with the
Japanese Right, while Kishi Nobusuke (released on 24 December 1948) eventually re-assumed the pos-
ition of foreign minister. For an excellent comparative study of Japanese post-war politics and poli-
ticians, see Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005).
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of Shigemitsu’s release and its response was personally attended to by Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai.36 The memos themselves, along with the marginalia and
notes made by Zhou, illustrate that China’s anger towards Japanese war crim-
inals had not dissipated. In one, Zhou has pensively written the word “illegal”
in English and underlined it in the margin – a slow contrast to his otherwise mas-
sively thick and rapid calligraphy that adorns so many other documents in the
archive.
Horror at successive releases of Japanese war criminals provided a prelude to
the full fledged anti-American propaganda that would emerge during the height
of the Korean War. The memos are important because they cut to the heart of the
legacy of Japanese war crimes in China and deepen the rift between China and
the United States. Each document stands in opposition to the release of war crim-
inals, first as an “illegal” action taken by the “devil MacArthur,” whose order
directly contradicts the original sentencing of many of the war criminals being
released by dramatically shortening their gaol-time, and secondly as a personal
insult and a humiliation to the entire Chinese nation.37 A 1951 memo submitted
for Zhou Enlai’s approval contends that MacArthur’s Order No. 5 interfered
with, or even negated, China’s “hard won rights through eight years of resistance
to Japan.”38
The Soviet Union, asserting its prerogative to steer China’s international
affairs, stressed that MacArthur’s decision to release war criminals not only con-
stituted a personal affront to the Chinese, but had become a broader inter-
national problem. “The American government,” the Soviets argued, “has taken
upon itself the great responsibility of MacArthur’s release of war criminals,
including Shigemitsu Mamoru [Zhongguang Kai 重光凯], whose crimes again
disturb international peace.”39 MacArthur’s release of Shigemitsu certainly
grated upon Chinese leaders, but being told how and when to express their out-
rage by the Soviets was also grating. Foreign Ministry documentation suggests
that Soviet involvement in Japanese war crimes issues was contributing to nascent
tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
36 Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai zhou enlai wengao (Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC),
Vol. 3, July 1950–December 1950 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008), pp. 544–46.
37 “Yijiuwuyi nian er yue Sulian zhengfu jiu Maikeahse feifa shifang Zhong Guangkui deng Riben zhan-
fan zhi Meiguo zhengfu zhi zhaohui chaojian” (“February 1951 handwritten note from Soviet govern-
ment to US government regarding MacArthur’s illegal release of Shigemitsu Mamoru and other
Japanese war criminals”), 15 February 1951, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document
105-00022-04; “Sulian zhengfu jiu zhuRi mengjun tongshuai Maikeahse nishi fang Zhong Guangkui
deng zhanfan gei Meiguo zhengfu zhi zhaohui yiwen yi wo waijiaobu dui cizhi yijian,” (“Translated
note from Soviet government to American government regarding Supreme Commander for Allied
Powers in Japan Douglas MacArthur’s intended plan to give free rein to Zhong Guangkui and other
Japanese war criminals and our Foreign Ministry’s views on this matter”), 12–13 May 1950, PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00022-01.
38 “1950 nian wu yue shiwu ri Zhou Enlai Waizhang qianzi MacArthur xuanbu tiqian Zhong Guangkui
deng zhan fan de shengming,” 15 May 1950, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document
105-00022-02.
39 “February 1951 handwritten note from Soviet government to US government regarding MacArthur’s
illegal release of Shigemitsu Mamoru and other Japanese war criminals.”
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Condemnations of American policy towards Japanese war criminals
represented an instance of Sino-Soviet co-operation and solidarity. However, dis-
agreements over the handling of Japanese war criminals by the Soviet Union also
illustrate the beginnings of a fissure between China and its northern patron. In
1950, China corresponded with Soviet Ambassador Roschin in pursuit of the
transfer of criminals held by the USSR. The Soviets unquestionably took
the lead in these negotiations, controlling the pace and the conditions of their
release. In an internal circulation Foreign Ministry document, the compilers
noted how former Manchukuo emperor Pu Yi had been turned over to the PRC:
On 18 July, the Chinese and Soviet governments resolved that the Soviets would return 961
Japanese war criminals to us along with the materials for their trials. On 3 August, the
Soviet Department of Prisoners of War Management representative Major Keliukov would
transfer Puppet Manchukuo Emperor and his high officials [da chen大臣], altogether 85 traitors
to be transferred to our Foreign Ministry’s representative Comrade Chen Xi. (Detail: This
includes the Puppet Manchukuo Emperor Pu Yi and his eight relatives, 13 Puppet
Manchukuo cabinet members and other important cabinet officials of Puppet Manchukuo.)40
Although the Soviet Union had returned Pu Yi and other Manchukuo prisoners,
they failed to convey all relevant files with the prisoners.41 It soon became clear
that the Soviets were intent upon maintaining for themselves the choicest docu-
mentary aspects of the Manchukuo legacy.
In 1951, the PRC sought further documentation on the war criminals returned
the previous year from the Soviet Union. This time, the request went out secretly
to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, where the Foreign Ministry asked the Soviet
Ambassador to “send materials and documents for the basis of prosecution of
war criminals of Japanese ancestry and Chinese Puppet-Manchukuo traitors.”
After acknowledging the previous transfer of the 971 Japanese war criminals
and 65 Manchukuo officials to the PRC (and subsequently the prison at
Fushun), the Foreign Ministry thanked the Soviet Ambassador for “including
the court records and partial self-circulating documents” for these transferred
individuals. Having established that the USSR had engendered goodwill in the
PRC via this transfer, the Foreign Ministry went on to request further such docu-
ments from the Ambassador, leaning on the Sino-Soviet Alliance (shorthanded as
“2/15”) for justification.
The PRC clearly wanted full control of the historical legacy of the Japanese
war criminals. Stalin had already shown a knack for spontaneously producing
– unannounced to the CCP as far as can be ascertained – and prosecuting
Japanese war criminals on a global stage, requiring the CCP to mount rapid
and extensive domestic propaganda campaigns about Japanese BW atrocities.42
40 “Zhongsu guanxi da shi ji zhi yi (yijiuwuling)” (“Chronicle of Sino-Soviet relations (1950)”), PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 109-01352-02, pp. 2–3.
41 Ibid.
42 When the Soviet Union began their unilateral trial of Japanese war criminals in Khabarovsk, Xinhua
faithfully published praise for Soviet friendship and repeated in detail the damning testimony of
Japanese BW officers; for example, see “Sulian yuandong binghaijun qu junshi fating” (“Soviet Far
East Naval District Court”), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 28 December 1949, p. 1.
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In addition to seizing the initiative, the hunt for documents of Japanese war
crimes clearly indicated the CCP’s drive for legitimacy and real historical closure.
The case of the 1951 request to the USSR for documents indicates again one of
the great strengths of the Foreign Ministry Archive, as it reveals that the desire
for the documents stemmed not from Mao and Zhou Enlai, but from another
segment of the PRC bureaucracy, the Central People’s Government Supreme
Court.43 At the same time, the sensitivity of the report can be seen in the manner
in which the Foreign Ministry handled disclosure of the request to the USSR, tell-
ing the Supreme Court that the matter was so secret that the Court could not
keep its own record of the matter until it had been resolved with the USSR.44
Kept abreast of the issue by Wu Xiuquan 伍修权, whose November 1950
speech to the UN had fairly blazed with anti-Japanese fury, Zhou Enlai tracked
the progress of the war criminals and associated documentation carefully.
In recapping the series of events that had brought Pu Yi and his cohort back
into Chinese hands in July 1950, Wu wrote to Zhou Enlai on 4 November 1951:
At that time, [Soviet] Ambassador Roschin was against publishing the news in the public press,
so we didn’t persist in our view of wanting to publish the information. Now we see that how we
resolved this incident was flawed. After [Vice-Foreign Minister and Head of Asia Section Chen]
Jiakang and I discussed it, I think that until today there has been no need to raise the issue, but
instead to wait until the appropriate opportunity, at which time we will discuss a response to the
matter. Along these lines, we already instructed the Public Security Bureau (gong’anju 公安局)
to submit a report about the situation after they had received the war criminals.45
The 1950 and 1951 co-operation on Japanese war criminals, though dominated
by the Soviets, is an essential portion of China’s narrative of the Japanese legacy,
and it is fortunate that the Foreign Ministry Archive has much material on the
matter. Eventually gaining possession of Japanese war criminals and Chinese
traitors from the Soviet Union, China then had the ability to hold trials indepen-
dently. However, it was not until 1956 that the PRC held its own large-scale
trials, marking both its independence from Moscow and its desire to place
matters of international policy under its own control.
The Shenyang Trials
The 1956 trials of Japanese war criminals in Shenyang (as well as in Taiyuan)
represent a new stage in the development of China both internally and interna-
tionally.46 After Stalin’s death, the Chinese government asserted increasing
independence in its dealings with Japan, and embarked upon an extensive
43 “Guanyu Sulian yijiao Riben zhanfan de laiwangwendian” (“Telegraph regarding Soviet transfer of
Japanese war criminals”), 27 June 1951–30 November 1951, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives, Document 118-00151-01, pp. 1, 5.
44 Ibid. p. 7.
45 Ibid. p. 20.
46. Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, “War criminals and the road to Sino-Japanese normalization: Zhou
Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954–1956,” Twentieth-century China, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2009), pp. 88–
110.
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programme of propaganda and “people’s diplomacy” towards Japan.47 Japanese
prisoners were held at Fushun prison outside the city of Shenyang, where they
underwent educational programmes designed both to induce increased under-
standing and sympathy for the communist revolution and to spur apologies for
past crimes.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed these apologies, and hurriedly
passed them to Xinhua for publication. Their appeal is relatively obvious, as is
the influence of the Fushun prison re-education programme. The apologies, pub-
lished by Xinhua after receiving approval from the Supreme People’s Court, were
personal pleas from war criminals to the Chinese people begging forgiveness. The
Japanese authors made no excuses for their individual behaviour, but explained
the consuming culture of militarism in which they had been raised – essentially
saying that they had trained from childhood to take part in Japan’s construction
of empire.48 Besides apologizing for past crimes, the authors railed against
imperialism, militarism and capitalism, truly epitomizing the reformed pris-
oner.49 Upon their release, some former criminals not only apologized but actu-
ally thanked the PRC and the Chinese people for “the magnanimous and
extraordinarily humanitarian treatment” they received while incarcerated at
Fushun.50
Although apologies were published to assuage any doubt of the orthodoxy of
releasing Japanese prisoners, the Shenyang trials and the re-education of the
Japanese were subject to heavy scrutiny, and occasionally the CCP faced both
internal and external criticism for its advocacy of such lenient policies. Some
people within the government were uncomfortable with the release of so many
Japanese war criminals, even if they had been subject to extensive re-education.
After all, only five years had passed since the CCP itself attacked the United
States for prematurely releasing Japanese prisoners like Shigemitsu.
Interestingly, these criticisms were often posed directly to, and in some ways
aimed at, Mao Zedong, who received them and made comments in the margins
in broad and elaborate calligraphy. To one transcript of Mao’s discussions with a
47 For more information on the “people’s diplomacy” and the post-Geneva Convention “peace offensive”
taken by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, see Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, pp. 5–9, 33–36. For an
excellent overview of the Japanese side of Sino-Japanese negotiations see Franziska Seraphim, War
Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center,
2006), pp. 108–34.
48 “Zai ya riben zhanfan sixiang qingkuang jianbao” (“A brief report on the Japanese war criminals in
custody and thoughts on the situation”), 26 April 1956–17 May 1956, PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Archives, Document 105-00502-07.
49 Kogori Ichiro, “Under the tower of treasure: Nosaka Sanzō, Japanese anti-war soldiers, and the Yanan
experience,” MA thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1988; Barak Kushner, The Thought War:
Japanese Imperial Propaganda (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), pp. 132–43; for interdis-
ciplinary analysis of re-education and communist legal practices, Phillip F. Williams and Yenna Wu,
The Great Wall of Confinement: The Chinese Prison Camp through Contemporary Fiction and
Reportage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
50 “Shifang di yi pi riben zhanfan de qingkuang baogao (bu bao), Fujian: zhanfan xiang zhonghua renmin
gongbeguo zhongyang zhengfu guanlisuo dangju de ganxie xing” (“First report on release of Japanese
war criminals and their letter of thanks to central government of PRC”), 22 August 1956, PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00503-07.
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group of visiting Japanese was appended a page-long criticism of Mao’s appar-
ently glib manner; the document voiced concern that the Chinese people would
not be able so easily to shrug off the impact of Japanese atrocities.51
Nevertheless, whatever criticisms were levelled against the Shenyang trials and
their methods, when they are posed against the Nuremberg trials, Tokyo trials,
Nationalist trials of Japanese and the Khabarovsk trials they appeared wholly
necessary for the PRC, and public opinion appeared to indicate as much.
A brief comment on the trials by a PLA legal office indicated pride in being
able finally to try Japanese war criminals; the officers were grateful that China
was no longer dependent on international military tribunals or surprise Soviet
prosecution of Japanese BW criminals.
In many ways, however, the inherent necessity of the Shenyang trials lay not in
the justice gained for crimes committed over ten years earlier, but rather in open-
ing up yet another vein of direct communication between the PRC and the
Japanese people. Since the early 1950s, China had been welcoming Japanese cul-
tural delegations and promoting friendship, if not rapprochement, between the
two nations. More than simply a play from the “people’s diplomacy” handbook,
the Shenyang trials and Sino-Japanese negotiations on the fate of war criminals
represent an era of independent Chinese foreign policy. In the years between the
Geneva Conference and the Great Leap Forward, the Foreign Ministry no longer
relied on a continuous exhumation of Japanese war crimes, nor the advice
and counsel of the Soviet Union. Foreign Ministry documents from this period
reveal both the depth of the sentiment and political utility, and suggest that
anti-Japanese feeling was and remains a flexible principle rather than an axio-
matic component of Chinese policy.
The period from 1957 to 1960 brought renewed Chinese focus on Japan
and recollections of the War of Resistance, stimulated in part by the ascendancy
of Kishi Nobusuke, the former Manchukuo economic official and inmate of
MacArthur’s Sugamo Prison, to the post of Prime Minister in Japan.52 The
PRC was truly beginning to gain independence from foreign powers in all aspects
of its development. However, the documentation in the Foreign Ministry Archive
indicates without a doubt that crimes committed almost 20 years in the past never
left the minds of Chinese leaders.
Conclusion
Japan’s wartime atrocities were not the sole catalyst for mass mobilization in the
early years of the PRC, but the role of anti-Japanese rhetoric and legacies of
51 “Mao Zedong zhuxi yu riben waibing tan ribenzhanfan wenti – kexueyuan jianbao ji waijiaobu baogao”
(“Chairman Mao Zedong and Japanese foreigners discuss the Japanese war criminal problem – science
academy report and Ministry of Foreign Affairs report”), 9–23 November 1956, PRC Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Archives, Document 105-00502-05.
52 “Riben qingbao baogao” (“Japanese intelligence report”), 15 November 1957, PRCMinistry of Foreign
Affairs Archives, Document 102-00036-06.
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the War of Resistance still need to be granted a place in the narrative of the
consolidation period. Documentation from the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive
illustrates the important role filled by the physical and psychological presence
of Japanese war criminals, their trials, and the memory of crimes committed
on the mainland. Specifically, the legacies of Japanese wartime atrocities became
inextricably linked with the diplomatic and domestic goals of the CCP through-
out the period of consolidation. Widespread propaganda filtered through the
Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry, military, legal systems and local govern-
ments, to be harnessed and released when the international or domestic situation
demanded mass mobilization.
To Serve Revenge for the Dead 1069
